Note: Diffusion curves are schematic, not descriptive.
The first was the rise of public expenditure, which more than doubled as a proportion of national income between 1920 and 1980. The second was a rise of household debt from around 50 percent of income in 1980 to three times as much in 2008, most of it incurred for homeownership. The rise of public expenditure is the 'social democracy' of the title. It was a fiscal innovation which reduced inequality. 1 The rise of household debt was an aspect of the 'market turn' which began in the 1980s, as a quest to privatise the delivery of government functions. This took place under the auspices of 'market liberalism', a pervasive political and social movement that holds up buying and selling as a norm for human relations. then onwards real house prices approximately doubled in a group of fourteen advanced countries. 3 Inequality also rose from the 1980s onwards, redistributing wealth and income from consumers to lenders, and from the young to the old, a process which still continues.
Both innovations arose to satisfy fundamental aspirations. Social democracy strove to provide employment, education, healthcare, social insurance, housing, and physical infrastructure. Market liberalism held out property ownership as an alternative source of economic security. In its time, each of these two innovations became a new social settlement.
Both were embraced as bi-partisan democratic strategies, and both were aligned with voter majority interests. That accounts for their durability. They were not parochial to the UK: similar developments took place across the developed world, at different times, paces and levels. Both eventually pushed against their limits, and moved into crisis.
I
Social democracy and market liberalism are two visions of society underpinned by different ethical norms. These norms however are captured by the single concept of a 'Just World Theory'. Such doctrines state that everyone gets what they deserve. 4 The statement can also be reversed: everyone deserves what they get. Social democracy arose out of the efforts of nineteenth-century political radicalism and the twentieth-century labour movement. It drew on the ethics of classical economics, whose doctrines were studied and taught in the first century after Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) . In this approach, value was created by three factors of production -labour, capital, and land. For the first two, income was the incentive for effort. Rent, the reward for landownership, was paid by the other two factors.
Land was productive, but not its ownership: if the owner departed, the land was still there.
For its owners, rising land values were a free lunch. North Oxford houses (like the author's) acquire their value from their location. The identity of their owner does not matter. For
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, landownership could be taxed with no effect on productive incentives. 5 This argument was restated by the American radical Henry George, who acquired a large following in the 1880s for his doctrine of the 'single tax', namely paying for government mostly by means of taxes on land. For the neoclassical economists who followed the classics after 1870, value did not arise from production, but from subjective preferences and effective demand. Some of them were motivated by an aversion to Henry George and his doctrines. 7 On the production side, they recognised only two factors, capital and labour, and they folded land into capital, treating the two factors as substitutes. Landownership was a service to production, like capital and labour. Everyone was entitled to be paid at least their marginal contribution to production, including the sleeping owners of assets. In contrast, the neoclassicals rejected the classical concept of an unearned increment, which was a tenet of nineteenth-century property rights, however acquired. Whatever people brought into the market, their inheritance and initial endowments of property and talent, was ethically deserved. What they took out as wages, profits, and rent, was also ethically deserved, with no further obligation to anyone. If perfect competition was assumed, then rents would be competed away, and unearned increments could not arise. The free market economy was both efficient and just, a natural order which it was futile to resist.
Like market liberalism, social democracy also had its roots in the movement for political and social emancipation which began with the Reformation and the enlightenment.
The principles of equality before God and the law were followed by voting for adults and citizenship for all. Social democracy was a 'Just World Theory' but with different premises: entitlement to economic security was acquired by citizenship, and everybody was entitled equally. As in classical economics, the point of departure was production, so alongside unproductive rentiers, there was also some mistrust of social outsiders and other misfits. and/or no cheating (which comes to the same thing).
It should be said that dependents in the early stage of life (infancy, childhood, education, motherhood) do not have the option to provide for themselves by this method. In these models, taxation is a 'deadweight cost' which distorts incentives, without reference to the benefits it might provide. 19 The standard of efficiency is the imagined Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium. It implies that extending the scope of the market ('market completion') increases efficiency. This theoretical notion was refuted by the 'theory of the second best' back in 1956, but this refutation is also widely ignored. 20 The policy implication of the neoclassical model is to promote markets for health, education, social insurance, and old age pensions.
In contrast, for social democracy dependency is certain but its timing is unknown for any individual. Risk is not personal, but actuarial, and its aggregate magnitude is known.
Hence the solution is collective risk pooling, underpinned by a norm of reciprocal obligation.
The institutional instrument is not financial markets but a reciprocal 'club' or a state agency. 21 The state can be viewed as a club of all its citizens. Transfers are not over time from individuals to themselves, but in the present from producers to dependents, mediated by a voluntary association or a state agency. As in Samuelson's model of overlapping generations, the transfers are cross-sectional from one generation to another in current time.
There is no hoarding of financial claims: transfers are financed by pay-as-you-go progressive taxation, and are spent as they are raised.
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Despite the persistent advocacy of market provision, it is never noticed that financial markets are not large enough to support welfare transfers. amounted to almost to 20 percent of GDP. 26 A simulation showed that over the period 1871-1999 in the United States, for pensions derived entirely from equity returns, the best outcome was almost six times higher than the worst one, depending on the timing of entry and exit.
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In contrast to stock markets, the tax base is large, stable and robust, comprising most of national income. With no need to lock in the future, transaction costs can be low. for house purchase, and held prices down. 51 They were not part of the clearing system, the payments system, or the interbank lending system, and had to rely on external bank accounts for access to these facilities. Unlike the banks, they could not conjure loans out of nothing.
Commercial banks in England had never lent very much on the security of real estate, which they regarded as illiquid and difficult to realize. 52 In the United States in the later nineteenth century, such lending was even notionally prohibited for national banks. 53 In 1980 the prohibition against bank mortgage lending ended, 'arguably one of the most significant acts of deregulation of the UK financial sector in the post-war period.' 54 It effectively lifted the ceiling on housing credit. No deposit constraint affected the banks, which were able to lend at will to credible borrowers. 55 In 1986 the building societies were allowed to convert into banks, thus removing their own constraints on lending. Convert they mostly did, drawing down the reserves accumulated by members over generations, and enriching their managers.
A surge of lending followed, which reached the ceiling of borrowing capacity in the space of a few years (figure 2). 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Housing is also the largest single consumer expenditure. Together with transport (a complement of housing-more distant locations pay lower rents but require more travel)
housing amounts to more than 45 percent of consumer expenditure in Britain and the USA, up from less than 30 percent in the 1920s.
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Everyone requires a roof, and housing competition is impossible to opt out of. With little new social housing and strict zoning restrictions, housing became increasingly scarce.
Its cost captured a rising share of rising incomes. Women worked more hours for wages, household incomes expanded to support rising debt service, and lenders lent out higher multiples of borrower incomes.
61
Owner occupation had long been part of the ideology of English conservatism, and had a political constituency. 62 Both main parties supported it. But it would be wrong to make too much of British circumstances. Similar policies were followed throughout Europe and the USA, regardless of political complexion. Owner occupation attracted tax privileges.
Shareholders paid tax on their dividends. But in the UK for example, the imputed rental value of owner occupation was no longer taxed as income after 1963, and mortgage interest was deductible from income tax as it still is in the United States. There was no capital gains tax on the primary residence, and inheritance tax was restricted to expensive houses. Higher rate tax 58 Stiglitz, 'The theory of credit', p. 25. 59 Independent Commission on Banking, Final report, figure 5 .4, p. 128. 60 Offer, 'Consumption and affluence, c. 1870-2010', pp. 212-217; For the USA, the same point (with different measures) in La Cava, 'Housing prices', p. 5. 61 Muellbauer, 'When is a housing market overheated?'; Offer, 'British manual workers', fig. 4 , p. 551. 62 Francis, '"Crusade to enfranchise"'.
rate depositors in building societies paid less tax on their savings there. Local taxation of housing was regressive, and in the late 1980s, the Conservative UK government devised a uniform head tax for housing which provoked evasion and even riots. When this 'poll tax' was withdrawn, the one that replaced it was still regressive. More recently, tax abatements for low earners have been withdrawn, and new subsidies introduced as 'Help to Buy', with an upper limit of about twice as much as the average house price in England and Wales. 63 As an attempt to subsidise home ownership it was futile. Low taxes merely liberated income from taxation to pay for higher levels of debt service, thus pushing up house prices, and creating a windfall for those whose houses had already been paid off.
V
With credit liberalised, household debt rose steeply after 1980 (figure 3). It rose threefold in relation to income in the UK, and rises in other countries were comparable. Some of the highest levels of indebtedness and its growth were reached in social-democratic countries. All this debt paid off for those who took it on. In the aggregate, housing wealth grew much more than debt (figure 4). In figure 4 , the bottom part of the columns (below the zero line) represents household debt. The segment above it is housing wealth, which rose as debt was paid down over time.
The next segment up is pension wealth. The top one, made up mostly of financial wealth is largely a balancing item for debt, and is only held by a small minority of households.
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Housing credit created a property windfall society, with the prospect of a free lunch for everybody. In the quest for economic security, the best personal strategy is to be rich.
Housing wealth held out the promise of financial security for a growing part of the population, as an alternative and complement to social insurance, and another pillar of personal security. It may even be regarded as the next progressive innovation beyond social insurance. A more educated and middle-income society aspired to a nest egg to supplement and even replace the organized reciprocity of social democracy. 64 Mian and Sufi, House of debt, p. 18. Source: Eurostat, ilc_lvho02. appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_lvho02&lang=en. Figure 5 shows the proportions of households in Europe by tenure status. In all European countries except Switzerland more than half of all households signed up for owner occupation, thus ensuring the support of a political majority. It is a curiosity that the highest levels of paid-off owner occupation can be found in the successor countries of the old Soviet bloc, due perhaps to the way in which housing was privatized. In the more developed part of the EU the proportion of paid-off housing was never more than 50 percent, and was only about a quarter in the UK. This quarter of households were the ultimate beneficiaries of the post-1970s policy and the ones most heavily invested in it.
VI
Easy credit carries a social cost. De-regulation drives inequality and financial instability. As house prices rose debt service captured a rising share of consumer expenditure. The labour share of income was falling everywhere. 65 The reason was not only stagnating wage income (which did not happen everywhere). shared between those who provided the finance, and by owner occupiers in proportion to the equity accumulated.
In the UK, the financial, business services and real estate sectors rose from about 17%
of GDP value added in 1970 to about 35% in 2006, neatly reversing ranking and magnitudes with manufacturing. 67 Debt service payments crowded out consumption, and also production and services catering to consumption. It was a transfer from consumers to hoarders, from public goods, financed by taxation, to rentiers and lenders. Lenders spend only a small proportion of their incomes -that is why they lend in the first place. In contrast, social spending transfers resources to those with the highest propensity to spend. Debt service depresses demand, economic activity and public services. By pushing up the cost of living, debt service also priced labour out of international competition, and was implicated in the UK's large and chronic trade deficit. As debt service increases, output volatility does as well:
marginal borrowers lose their jobs and are unable to service loans. A housing downturn also slows down construction and employment. The transition from optimism to pessimism quenches the wealth-effect spending of paid-up owners.
Even a small downturn was enough to destabilise the banks, with their high leverage.
But most banks were not allowed to fail. They were bailed out, albeit sometimes at a loss to the shareholders. In consequence, and also due to the long recession that followed, public debt increased. Austerity was then imposed on public spending, but this only worked to raise the debt and especially to squeeze social democracy. That may have been the intention, following the logic of disaster capitalism, in which the opportunity of a crisis is used to push through partisan policies.
68
In the property windfall economy, early movers did best. The 'Great Moderation', the long period of low interest rates which formed the policy target statistic of the newly independent central banks, acted to raise house prices. Gradually house purchase rose beyond the reach of low earners. This was already becoming evident in the 1990s. If it required two incomes to support house-purchase, marriage was actually fraying during these decades, with almost fifty percent ending in divorce in the USA, and a growing number of single-head households, with and without children.
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A social divide began to grow, between those on the property ladder, and those unable to reach its first rung. A new 'generation rent' suffered insecure, expensive and inadequate housing, without much hope of ownership except by means of bequests. 70 The only secure way to afford housing was to work for the lenders, i.e. get a job in finance. This has diverted talent away from socially useful work, and has undermined more productive parts of the economy. Debt is sustainable and even desirable if it produces more output than the cost of debt service. If it does not, its share of income continues to grow by means of compound interest.
Two separate items appeared in the London
When the debt service rate of interest is higher than economic growth, then debt services takes a growing share of national output, reduces the reward for labour and for entrepreneurial capital, and diminishes demand, thus abating growth in the following year. 
VII
What is to be done? Policy is not the task of economic historians but the options are instructive. There are two issues each of which may require different approaches. The first is the immediate problem of debt overhang, the second to devise a regime to prevent its recurrence. The solutions being discussed break away from the previous consensus.
Induce inflation in order to reduce the real debt? That is how the debt overhang of World War II was overcome, but it would require quite high inflation over a long period of time. Write off debt selectively or universally? If a debt cannot be repaid, it will not be. Does it make sense to restructure or forgive? 75 There is a venerable tradition of jubilees in which debts were cancelled. 76 But the web of debt is complicated and it is hard to know where the cost will fall. For example, pensioners, both private and public, are creditors of mortgage providers. Some drastic ideas combine debt write-offs with the re-assertion of government's authority to issue money, 77 and for governments to buy up private debt. A good deal of quantitative easing has already done exactly that.
The second challenge is how to avoid another debt crisis. The preferred solution is higher capital requirements for the banks, to reduce their leverage. 78 It is hard to believe that this will be effective. At the levels at which it is proposed, between five and 10 percent of bank assets, depending on definitions, any requirement for more capital during the boom phase can be met by the ability of commercial banks to generate credit almost at will for the purchase of their capital. This will be less costly than the value of the additional business generated. Barclays bank was even able to do this at the depth of the crisis, by lending £3bn
to Qatar to fund the purchase of its own shares. Regulators averted their gaze. 79 Another option is to revert to credit rationing. Several mechanisms might bring deposit finance and mortgage loan maturities into better alignment, including a return to mutual society intermediation. 80 It might also possible to ration speculative credit and to channel it to productive activities. 81 Finally, a good deal of the housing problem arises not from excess demand but from the shortfall of supply. One solution might be to subsidise and build for those on lower incomes. This may be preferable to dismantling the zoning and planning systems which protect the environment where land is scarce.
These are drastic solutions. All of them, one way or another, take away the free lunch of rising house values. Can society cope? If social insurance and owner-occupation are the twin pillars of contemporary welfare, taking one of them away is going to confound expectations. But for one part of the population, the punchbowl has already been taken away.
About 45 percent of UK households live in rented accommodation, under conditions of tenure that were getting worse, and a cost that continues to rise faster than incomes. Many of house buyers find that debt service is a struggle. If interest rates rise, they may find it impossible. Doing nothing may win some time until the next financial crisis. Maybe that is an advantage. We do not know precisely who is going to be hurt and how. Quite reasonably in
April 2016, the date of this lecture, the choice appeared to be for a drastic crisis later, in preference to drastic action now.
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